### 1

#### New sanctions won’t pass – democrats

Hooper 12-4 – Capitol Hill reporter for the Hill (Molly, “House bill would bash Iran deal”, December 4 of 2013, http://thehill.com/homenews/house/191986-house-bill-would-bash-tehran-deal)

“I think that we should have a sense of the House that we oppose the deal,” said Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif.), a senior Foreign Affairs Committee member. Some Democrats would likely vote for such a measure, though Rohrabacher suspects “there are a lot of people on the Democratic side of the aisle who seem to feel compelled to support the administration on anything they possibly can, and this might fall within that range because you’ve got a Democratic president under attack.” More than a few Republicans, including Senate Minority Whip John Cornyn (Texas), have suggested the Iran agreement was timed to distract from the disastrous rollout of ObamaCare. It is unclear when the House will act on an Iran resolution; the lower chamber is scheduled to adjourn for the year at the end of next week.

#### Plan trades off

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### PC key

Woods 11-25 – Newsmax political correspondent (Amy, “Obama Mounts 'Aggressive' Drive to Woo Congress on Iran Deal”, November 25 of 2013, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Obama-aggressive-Congress-Iran/2013/11/25/id/538641)

The White House is casting the nuclear agreement reached Sunday with Iran as part of a solution to conflict in the Middle East, and will push Congress to hold off issuing new sanctions on the country. The Wall Street Journal reported that President Barack Obama is launching an "aggressive campaign" against new sanctions and said such measures might throw off the deal reached in Geneva. Obama wants Congress to sit back for six months to let the agreement work. "Huge challenges remain," Obama said Monday during a speech in San Francisco. "But we cannot close the door on diplomacy, and we cannot rule out peaceful solutions to the world's problems. Tough talk and bluster may be the easy thing to do politically, but it's not the right thing for our security." Administration officials said Obama will speak at length about Middle East diplomacy when the president gives his 2014 State of the Union address. Democrats, including New York Sen. Chuck Schumer, and Republicans, including South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham, are eager to push for more sanctions out of distrust of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. "The Obama administration has managed, somehow, to bring the Arabs and Israelis together, and they may have created bipartisanship at a time when I thought it was impossible," Graham said. "The deal does not accomplish the goal of beginning to dismantle the [Iranian nuclear] program." While some congressional leaders are considering legislation that will impose sanctions six months from now, White House officials remain unsatisfied with that because it constitutes new economic punishment on the country that could threaten the treaty, NBC News reported.

#### New sanctions cause Iran war

WORLD TRIBUNE 11 – 13 – 13 [Obama said to suspend Iran sanctions without informing Congress, <http://www.worldtribune.com/2013/11/13/obama-said-to-suspend-iran-sanctions-without-informing-congress/>]

The administration has also pressured Congress to suspend plans for new sanctions legislation against Iran. The sources said the White House effort has encountered resistance from both Democrats and Republicans, particularly those in the defense and foreign affairs committees. “I urge the White House and the Senate to learn from the lessons of the past and not offer sanctions relief in return for the false hopes and empty promises of the Iranian regime,” Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairwoman of the House Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, said. “Instead, new rounds of sanctions must be implemented to gain further leverage because any misstep in calculations at this juncture will have devastating and irreversible consequences that will be difficult to correct retroactively.” On Nov. 12, the White House warned that additional sanctions on Iran would mean war with the United States. White House press secretary Jay Carney, in remarks meant to intensify pressure on Congress, said sanctions would end the prospect of any diplomatic solution to Iran’s crisis. “The American people do not want a march to war,” Carney said. “It is important to understand that if pursuing a resolution diplomatically is disallowed or ruled out, what options then do we and our allies have to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon?” Still, the Senate Banking Committee has agreed to delay any vote on sanctions legislation until a briefing by Secretary of State John Kerry on Nov. 13. The sources said Kerry was expected to brief the committee on the P5+1 talks in Geneva that almost led to an agreement with Teheran. “The secretary will be clear that putting new sanctions in place would be a mistake,” State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said on Nov. 12. “We are still determining if there’s a diplomatic path forward. What we are asking for right now is a pause, a temporary pause, in sanctions.”

#### Iran war escalates

White, July/August 2011 (Jeffrey—defense fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, What Would War With Iran Look Like, National Interest, p. <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=982>)

A U.S.-Iranian war would probably not be fought by the United States and Iran alone. Each would have partners or allies, both willing and not-so-willing. Pre-conflict commitments, longstanding relationships, the course of operations and other factors would place the United States and Iran at the center of more or less structured coalitions of the marginally willing. A Western coalition could consist of the United States and most of its traditional allies (but very likely not Turkey, based on the evolution of Turkish politics) in addition to some Persian Gulf states, Jordan and perhaps Egypt, depending on where its revolution takes it. Much would depend on whether U.S. leaders could persuade others to go along, which would mean convincing them that U.S. forces could shield them from Iranian and Iranian-proxy retaliation, or at least substantially weaken its effects. Coalition warfare would present a number of challenges to the U.S. government. Overall, it would lend legitimacy to the action, but it would also constrict U.S. freedom of action, perhaps by limiting the scope and intensity of military operations. There would thus be tension between the desire for a small coalition of the capable for operational and security purposes and a broader coalition that would include marginally useful allies to maximize legitimacy. The U.S. administration would probably not welcome Israeli participation. But if Israel were directly attacked by Iran or its allies, Washington would find it difficult to keep Israel out—as it did during the 1991 Gulf War. That would complicate the U.S. ability to manage its coalition, although it would not necessarily break it apart. Iranian diplomacy and information operations would seek to exploit Israeli participation to the fullest. Iran would have its own coalition. Hizballah in particular could act at Iran’s behest both by attacking Israel directly and by using its asymmetric and irregular warfare capabilities to expand the conflict and complicate the maintenance of the U.S. coalition. The escalation of the Hizballah-Israel conflict could draw in Syria and Hamas; Hamas in particular could feel compelled to respond to an Iranian request for assistance. Some or all of these satellite actors might choose to leave Iran to its fate, especially if initial U.S. strikes seemed devastating to the point of decisive. But their involvement would spread the conflict to the entire eastern Mediterranean and perhaps beyond, complicating both U.S. military operations and coalition diplomacy.

### 2

**A. Discourses of danger reproduces an American identity – that posits the US as a the defender of global freedom and liberty**

**Campbell, 98**- Professor of International Politics University of Newcastle (David, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity)

The crisis of representation the United States faces is unique only in the particularities of its content. The form of the dilemma is something common to all states. The state has never been a stable ground on which a fixed identity has been secured against danger: the variety of state forms throughout modernity have always been a historically contingent panoply of practices that have served to constitute identity through the negation of difference and the temptation of otherness. With the intensification of state power in the late nineteenth century, Foreign Policy helped contain and discipline the identities to which foreign policy had given rise. In our late modern era, where we find proliferating challenges that cannot be readily contained within the state, the discourse of danger associated with the discursive economy of foreign policy/Foreign Policy will have to work overtime to overcome the ever present threats to the once stable representation of an always unstable sovereign domain. The discursive economy of foreign policy will thus be taxed in its efforts to reproduce and contain challenges to the political identity of nations such as the United States. However, for (the United States of) America— which I have argued is the imagined community par excellence, the state that requires a discourse of danger probably more than any other— the crisis of representation is particularly acute. The operation of anticommunism as a prominent discourse of danger in the United States throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries— with its ability to encompass the entire population, intensively structure the practices of everyday life, and offer a link between internal and external threats in ways that circumscribe the boundaries of legitimacy— is probably the best example of an effective discourse of danger. But with (as discussed in the Introduction) the globalization of contingency, the erasure of the markers of certainty, and the rarefaction of political discourse, reproducing the identity of "the United States" and containing challenges to it are likely to require new discourses of danger. Of course, talk of a shift from old to new discourses of danger drastically oversimplifies the complexity of this cultural terrain. Transformations of this kind do not occur in discrete or sequential stages, for there has always been more than one referent around which danger has crystallized. What appears as new is often the emergence of something previously obscured by that which has faded away or become less salient. In this context, there is no shortage on the horizons of world politics of potential candidates for new discourses of danger (such as AIDS, "terrorism," and the general sign of anarchy and uncertainty). Consider just one example. The environment has occasionally emerged as an international discourse of danger. For example, a focus on the environmental catastrophes of Eastern Europe has been prominent. 2 One of the effects of this interpretation has been to reinscribe East-West understandings of global politics in a period of international transformation by suggesting that "they" in the East are technologically less sophisticated and ecologically more dangerous than "we" in the West. This produces a new boundary that demarcates the "East" from the "West" in a period when the old frontiers of identity are no longer sustainable. But environmental danger can also be figured in a manner that challenges traditional forms of identity inscribed in the capitalist economy of the "West." As a discourse of danger that results in disciplinary strategies that are de-territorialized, involve communal cooperation, and refigure economic relationships, the environment can serve to enframe a different rendering of "reasoning man" than that associated with the subjectivities of liberal capitalism, thereby making it more unstable and undecidable than anticommunism. 3 The major issues regarding the possible emergence of a new discourse of danger(s) in this period can be indicated by some questions. In terms of the reproduction of American identity along the lines established in the cold war, will any of the likely candidates be as extensive or intensive as that which they are needed to replace? In other words, are we going to witness the persistence of cold war practices even after their most recent objects of contention have passed on? Will these practices be represented in the mode of the society of security? Or, alternatively, do any of the new dangers being focused on in this juncture contain the possibility for a different figuration of American identity that would diverge from the enmity of the cold war? These questions, dealing with the rewriting of security, inform the argument in the remaining chapters. To make the analysis more specific, the first task is to consider an issue that has been officially identified a danger or threat necessitating vigilance and defense in the (so-called) post-cold war world: the incidence of drug consumption in America. Before proceeding, an observation about the strategy of argumentation employed in this chapter is in order. It begins with a consideration of the claims of "fact" made by the policy discourses to support their articulation of danger. In discussing counterevidence, my intent is not to juxtapose one realm of fact with another. To the contrary, my desire is to demonstrate that within each realm of policy discourse it is possible to construct, in its own terms, a competing narrative that denaturalizes and unsettles the dominant way of constructing the world, thus prying open the space for an alternative interpretation concerned with the entailments of identity. Indeed, although I begin this chapter by operating largely within the terms of these policy discourses, I have attempted to politicize the terms of the debate. For example, instead of "the drug problem" or "drug abuse" I speak of "drug consumption"; instead of "drug users" or "addicts" I speak of "drug consumers" or "people addicted"; and instead of "drug traffickers" and "cartels" I speak of the "drug industry." Of course, no representation is neutral, and the terms of my discourse are certainly contestable, but their estranging quality is designed to help make obvious the way in which formulations of identity are sequestered within even the technical arguments of public policy with which we are most familiar. 4 As such, this consideration of contemporary discourses illustrates the relevance to the current period of the idea that foreign policy/Foreign Policy is constitutive of political identity.

**B. That makes extinction inevitable**

**Willson, 02**- Ph.D New College San Fransisco, Humanities, JD, American University (Brian, “Armageddon or Quantum Leap? U.S. Imperialism and Human Consciousness from an Evolutionary Perspective”, [**http://www.brianwillson.com/quantum.html**](http://www.brianwillson.com/quantum.html))

Awaiting the impending U.S. government's concocted "preventive" war against Iraq (indeed, against the world), this is perhaps one of the most frightening moments in human history. In a surreal scenario, the U.S. government is renewing active threats of using nuclear weapons and reviving use of anti-personnel land mines, and is introducing new technological weapons of death we can only imagine, and some we cannot. As grim as this scene is, I believe it must be the inevitable and logical extension of the continued growth ad nauseum of the American Way Of Life (AWOL) in particular, and the Western Way Of Life in general. Premeditated murder of thousands--perhaps millions--of innocents is the price for AWOL's insatiable consumption and its bloodthirsty vengeance, totally abdicating responsibility for lethal consequences to the planet and its species, including, ironically, our own. Perhaps Gaia is presenting the current transparent dangers to us as like a cosmic gift so that we might actually be able to *see* the extraordinary folly of our ways in time to creatively "storm the Bastille."U.S. Terrorist Roots U.S. civilization was founded on and has been sustained by terrorism, facilitated by Eurocentric racism, classism, and arrogant ethnocentrism. The grossest irony of all, of course, is that the "War on Terror," to be successful, must focus on our own civilization, the most egregious proponent of terror the world has even known. Terror was systematically utilized since our country's beginnings in the 1600s. The following instructions, facilitated by a cruel racism, are part of the historic record: "burning and spoiling the [Indian] country," (Captain John Underhill, Massachusetts Bay Colony, 1636); "put to death the [Pequot Indian] men of Block Island" (Massachusetts Bay Governor John Winthrop's order to Captain John Endecott, 1637); "laying waste," and instilling "terror...by any means" among the Indians (General George Washington, 1779); "[with] malice enough in our hearts to destroy everything that contributes to their support" (General John Sullivan, 1779).

In a prominent history book published in 1906 (*The History of the United States,* James Wilford Garner, Ph.D. and Henry Cabot Lodge, Ph.D, L.L.D), the "destruction" of the American Indian is explained as follows: "History teaches that inferior people must yield to a superior civilization....They must take on civilization or pass out. The Negro was able to endure slavery while learning the rudiments of civilization; the Indian could not endure slavery, and...refused to be taught." Attitudes uttered by white, Puritan, Christian men, civilian and military, thus set the tone for our civilization, sentiments that to this day have not been seriously renounced. We remain primarily a white male supremacy society with overtly expressed as well as suppressed sentiments of racism and classism dominating much of our political life and foreign policy. How can someone drop a bomb knowing that thousands of innocents will be murdered if the bomber is not possessed by cruel racism and/or ugly ethnocentrism? Conveniently left out of the historical record is the fact that our civilization has been founded on three holocausts, the first being theft of virtually all our land base at gunpoint while murdering millions of the original inhabitants. The second brought us "free" labor from Africa, but resulted in two-thirds of all those originally targeted for apprehension being murdered in the process of trying to escape or from being stowed as human cargo in slave ships known as floating coffins. The third holocaust took place during what the founder and publisher of *Time* and *Life* magazines, Thomas Luce, called "The American Century." This century witnessed more than 300 military and perhaps 10,000 covert interventions by the U.S. into more than 100 countries, stealing resources at gunpoint while murdering millions of the increasing numbers of impoverished people struggling for independence. "American exceptionalism" must succeed at *any* cost. In the process, the three Buddhist "poisons" are employed: greed -- for profit at any cost of human suffering; hatred -- of any obstacles to profit; ignorance -- of the intimate link between Western corporations/governments and "Third World" repressive regimes.  U.S. Oligarchy It does not matter which of the two parties, the republocrats or demoblicans, is in power. They both easily consented to the selection of their chief executive officer in violation of the rights of thousands of illegally disenfranchised Black voters, and of their Constitutional system itself that makes no provision for the Supreme Court to make such selection. Both believe in preserving the "national security" of AWOL, which means continued, unabated acceleration of extraction, consumption and pollution patterns, and obscene profits for the plutocrats and their bribed oligarchs in Washington. For all this to happen, Mr. Bush, indeed, has laid out the necessary plans for a world imperium to assure, in his and his cohorts' minds, continuation of our Western way of life, business- and profits-as-usual.  These oligarchs are not able to perceive the fact that further continuation of AWOL guarantees our destruction. They are not able to even consider the need for radical contraction and creative alternatives. They act as if blind drunk with their personal and political values of money and power, under the cloak of their disfigured version of Jesus. Unfortunately, the inevitable consequences of their business-as-usual forces are systematic destruction of virtually all sustainable ecosystems and human-created institutions.   Origins of "Civilization" Some history. As the revolution of urban civilization took root some 5,000 years ago the basic ingredients of "Western civilization" were introduced into our human evolutionary journey. The basic model of "civilization," for all but the most isolated and exceptional Indigenous groups, has seen the advent of powerful male oligarchs surrounded by elite bureaucracies of scribes and priests, overseeing hierarchies that involuntarily enforced large numbers of laborers, often violently captured during wars, to construct large projects for the pleasure of the king. Wars, systematic violence, and harsh class division originated with "civilizations." Secrecy of priestly knowledge about cosmic regularities and calendar-making assured that knowledge was monopolized by the small elite surrounding the oligarch. And the maxim, "the best defense is attack," was often used in early warfare, roots of our preventive strikes of today. According to Asian and Scandinavian scholars there have been nearly 15,000 wars during the last 5,000 years.   Extraordinarily Dangerous Trends The U.S. economy reveals increasing vulnerabilities to the fiction and hot air behind Wall Street and the continued exploitation and creation of misery upon which it is based. The U.S. regime has chosen to protect its illusion of omnipotence under the veil of fighting "terrorism" and its curtailing of civil liberties is similar to a police state. Increasingly desperate means used by people in power to maintain that power is a historically typical, predictable phenomenon. Never before, however, have oligarchs commanded so much power and possessed so many weapons of mass destruction, with explicit intentions to use such weapons preventively rather than defensively. I believe that we are at a pivotal point in history. We sit precariously perched on a ledge overlooking imminent extinction as a very real possibility at this juncture in our long, 7- to 8-million-year human evolutionary journey. Academics often talk about how history is cyclical, but two demonstrable trends, clearly not cyclical, indicate that we are dangerously near the end of our evolutionary branch

**C. Alternative text – reject the affirmative to desecuritize the Political. Vote negative to challenge securitization itself in favor of a political ethic that approaches problems in non-security terms and exposes the limits of their methodology.**

### 3

#### Economic engagement is a conditional QPQ

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.

* The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.
* The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China.
* The tactics of economic engagementshouldpromote China’s economic integration through negotiationsontrade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged.
* The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8

[To footnotes]

8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in FareedZakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

Vote negative

a) Limits – policies the embargo means there’s a near-infinite range of “one exception” affs

b) Ground – unconditional engagement denies us “say no” and backlash arguments which are a crucial part of the engagement debate

### 4

The United States federal government should

- ask the governments of Brazil and Mexico to diplomatically engage Cuba on its behalf

- inform Brazil and Mexico that it will abide by the results of negotiations

- implement any policy changes that negotiations between Brazil, Mexico, and Cuba recommend and

-establish an embassy in the Republic of Cuba

Solves the case and preserves US soft power

Iglesias 12 – Commander of the US Navy (Carlos, “United States Security Policy

Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba”, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408~~)

Unlike the policy implications above, the major hurdle to this interest does not ¶ come from any continuation of the GOC, but from the rest of the world. International ¶ opposition to the perceived fairness and effectiveness of the economic sanctions has¶ long posed an obstacle for U.S. policy. In the global scale, the problem is epitomized by ¶ the twenty consecutive years of near unanimous UN General Assembly resolution votes ¶ against the embargo. 96 More regionally, Spain and other European Union partners have ¶ strongly pushed to loosen sanctions. The arguments are straightforward and pragmatic, ¶ “since sanctions in place have not worked, it makes more sense to do things that would ¶ work, and (the next obvious one is to) change things.”97 Even more locally, Cuba has ¶ managed to generally retain positive feelings among the people of Latin American in ¶ spite of the country’s domestic realities.98 The rise of Raúl and any subsequent ¶ successions further complicated the problem of mustering international consensus.¶ Several countries in the hemisphere see any new Cuban leadership as fresh opportunities to engage in common interests. The two largest Latin American countries, ¶ Brazil and Mexico, have both ascribed to this approach and have indicated their ¶ interests in forging new ties since Fidel’s stepped down.99¶ On the other hand, this international dissention does hold some prospect for ¶ leveraging U.S. soft power. An indirect approach would be to coordinate U.S. proxy ¶ actions with partner countries interested in Cuba. This has the double benefit of ¶ leveraging U.S. soft power without compromising legislated restrictions or provoking¶ hard-line Cuban-American ire. In this approach, burgeoning relations with Brazil and ¶ Mexico would be strong candidates. Devoid of the “bullhorn diplomacy” that have ¶ marginalized U.S.-Cuban policy efficacy for decades, the U.S. could better engage the ¶ island through hemispherical interlocutors. At a minimum, U.S. interests would be ¶ advanced through the proxy insights of what is occurring on the island in addition to the ¶ potential displacement of anti-American influences (e.g. Chávez).¶ 100Another potential gain for U.S. interests would be to upgrade its diplomatic ¶ presence on the island. For decades, the countries have reciprocated diplomacy ¶ marginalization with low-level “interest sections” in each other capitals. The fallback ¶ reasoning for the U.S. has always been that it did not want to appear to reward the ¶ GOC’s legitimacy with an embassy. This is myopic and inconsistent. The national ¶ strategy clearly promotes engagement in order to “learn about the intentions and nature ¶ of closed regimes, and to plainly demonstrate to the public within those nations that ¶ their governments are to blame for their isolations.¶ 101 Additionally, the diplomatic level is ¶ inconsistent with the longstanding U.S. accreditation of ambassadors to both friendly ¶ and hostile governments.102 An embassy in Cuba could support critical awareness and engagements. In the event of an opportunity or crisis, this presence could be the ¶ difference between knowing where, when, and with whom to act or just watching from ¶ across the Florida Straits.

### Adv 2

**The impact is exaggerated – Cuban ag isn’t sustainable**

**Thompson and Stephens, 12** – \* Ph.D. Curriculum and Education Director @ Duke University AND \*\* Marian Cheek Jackson Center (Charles D. and Alexander, “Visions for Sustainable Agriculture in Cuba and the United States: Changing Minds and Models through Exchange”, Southern States, March 22 2013, http://www.southernspaces.org/2012/visions-sustainable-agriculture-cuba-and-united-states-changing-minds-and-models-through-exchan) //SP

Following the Cuban Revolution (1953–59), the Soviet Union’s (USSR) agricultural imperatives drove the island toward state-run farms, marginalizing many family run operations. The breakup of the USSR in 1990 spelled the end of Soviet agricultural influence but intensified Cuban food shortages. **Cuba began to look within for solutions, finding indigenous knowledge and encouraging local innovation. Exaggerated praise for developments in the country’s sustainable agriculture belies the reality that Cuba is no utopia**. Popular descriptions often oversimplify the narrative of Cuba’s sustainable agriculture. For example, the website of the Durham, North Carolina, non-profit NEEM (Natural Environment Ecological Management) features a narrative sketch that labels the rise of organic garden collectives in Cuban cities "the urban agriculture miracle."5 Others have suggested that we can expect "an ecological agriculture" in Cuba’s future.6 In much sustainable agriculture praise of Cuba, we do not hear that the country (like the U.S.) has confinement hog and chicken houses, that major U.S. food conglomerates are already selling vast quantities of grain and other products there, or that the embargo on trade with Cuba does not apply to U.S. agribusiness. **We are not told that thousands work in small farming because they have no other option.** Agricultural work is popular in Cuba, in part, because state-supported income is drying up for hundreds of thousands of wage earners and there is often nowhere else to turn but to small-scale farms and gardens. Yet much of Cuba’s former sugarcane land, once a volatile but powerful economic life-force, is idle and in poor condition. **Even with its admirable innovations in sustainable and organic farming,** **Cuba’s domestic agricultural producers cannot meet the food needs of the island’s population; there is a real sense of food insecurity.** Looking for food (in dollar stores, on the black market, legally), is a major pre-occupation for much of the population. Cuba imports at least 80 percent of its food, with much of it coming from its largest trading partners—China and Venezuela. This is hardly a sustainable scenario, and while there does not appear to be starvation in Cuba, **food shortages remain a problem, even as the government’s meager food rationing is fading.**7 However, household food insecurity is also on the rise in the U.S. today. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture at least 14.5% of U.S. households were food insecure at some time during the year in 2010, up from 11% in 2005.

**Zero chance the US adopts the Cuban model**

**Pfeiffer, 3** – energy editor for From the Wilderness (Dale, “Cuba-A Hope”, From the Wilderness,

<http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/120103_korea_2.html>.

Resistance to Cuban-style agricultural reform would be particularly stiff in the United States. Agribusiness will not allow all of its holdings and power to be expropriated. Nor is the U.S. government interested in small farms and organic agriculture. The direction of U.S. agriculture is currently towards more advanced technology, greater fossil fuel dependency, and less sustainability. The ability of small farmers and urban gardens to turn a profit is effectively drowned out by the overproduction of agribusiness.

#### No impact to biodiversity

**Easterbrook, 03** – senior fellow at the New Republic, 03 [“We're All Gonna Die!”, <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic_set>=]

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote *Remembrance of Things Past* while lying in bed.

#### Empirical trends disprove warming impacts

Goklany 11 - a science and technology policy analyst for the United States Department of the Interior (Indur M., “Misled on Climate Change: How the UN IPCC (and others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming” December 2011, <http://goklany.org/library/Reason%20CC%20and%20Development%202011.pdf>, PZ)

Discussion and Conclusions **Despite claims that GW will reduce human well-being in poor countries, there is no evidence that this is actually happening**. Empirical trends **show that by any objective climate-sensitive measure, human well-being in such countries has improved remarkably over the last several decades**. Specifically, **agricultural productivity has increased; the proportion of people suffering from chronic hunger has declined; the rate of extreme poverty has been more than halved; rates of death and disease from malaria, other vector-borne diseases and extreme weather events have declined.** Together, these improvements correspond with life expectancy in poor countries more than doubling since 1900. **The fact that these improvements have occurred in spite of GW indicates that economic and technological development has been**, overall, **a very significant benefit to people in poor countries.**

#### World oil prices high—job reports, economy, Brent and WTI

Channel News Asia 12/7 ("Oil prices gain after bullish US jobs report", 12/7/13, [www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/oil-prices-gain-after/913342.html //](http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/oil-prices-gain-after/913342.html%20/) candle)

NEW YORK: World oil prices pushed higher on Friday after a solid jobs report for November signalled unexpected strength in the US economy. The US unemployment rate fell sharply to 7.0 per cent from 7.3 per cent in October, and the number of jobs generated last month, 203,000, was well above expectations. New York's main contract, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude for delivery in January, added 27 cents to close at $97.65 a barrel. Brent North Sea crude for January finished at $111.61 a barrel, up 63 cents from Thursday's close. The European benchmark Brent retained broad support from concerns about a supply disruption in the North Sea. Fierce winter storms continued to batter northern Europe with hurricane-force winds Friday, leaving at least 10 people dead and hundreds of thousands suffering power blackouts and road, rail and air transport chaos. The US WTI strength came from the jobs numbers, which together with other data have suggested economic growth is firming, a good sign for the country's huge oil market.

#### American technology is key to Cuban oil development—plan unlocks exports

Padgett 8 (Tim is a TIME contributor and Miami and Latin America Bureau Chief; 10/23/08; http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1853252,00.html// candle)

The Spanish energy company Repsol-YPF has entered into a production-sharing agreement with Cupet and is scheduled to start drilling the first real well in the EEZ next year. Other international firms, including Norway's StatoilHidro and India's Oil & Natural Gas Corp., are part of the Repsol-led consortium. Venezuela's state-run Petroleos de Venezuela is considered a lesser player because it has little deep-water drilling experience. (China is also interested but so far only involved in onshore drilling in Cuba.) Cuba is now in important negotiations with Brazil's Petrobras, which just made its own multibillion-barrel oil find off its coast near Rio de Janeiro and could, analysts say, be the major offshore drilling partner for Cuba if it jumps in.¶ Still, the concessions so far represent less than a quarter of the 59 drilling blocks that Cuba hopes to exploit in the 43,000-sq.-mi. (112,000 sq km) EEZ. Analysts say one reason is the daunting infrastructural difficulties facing any company that drills in Cuba: firms have to bring much more of their own capital, equipment, technology and on-the-ground know-how than usual. This year's severe hurricane damage in Cuba has made the situation worse. Canada's Sherritt, in fact, recently dropped out of its four-block contract. "Who else is going to be willing to actually come in and take the risk in Cuba?" says Benjamin-Alvarado. "In terms of proximity and technology, the only people really able to do it to the extent the Cubans need are the Americans

#### That causes Saudi Arabia to flood the oil market and collapse prices

**Morse and Richards 2** (Edward L. Morse is Executive Adviser at Hess Energy Trading Company and was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Energy Policy in 1979-81. James Richard is a portfolio manager at Firebird Management, an investment fund active in eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, Foreign Affairs, March/April)

A simple fact explains this conclusion: 63 percent of the world's proven oil reserves are in the Middle East, 25 percent (or 261 billion barrels) in Saudi Arabia alone. As the largest single resource holder, Saudi Arabia has a unique petroleum policy that is designed to maximize the benefit of holding so much of the world's oil supply. Saudi Arabia's goal is to assure that oil's role in the international economy is maintained as long as possible. Hence Saudi policy has always denounced efforts by industrialized countries to wean themselves from oil dependence, whether through tax policy or regulation. Saudi strategy focuses on three different political arenas. The first involves the ties between the Saudi kingdom and other OPEC countries. The second concerns Riyadh's relationship with the non- OPEC producers: Mexico, Norway, and now Russia. Finally, there is Saudi Arabia's link to the major oil-importing regions -- most importantly North America, but also Europe and Asia. Given the size of the Saudi oil sector, the kingdom has a unique and critical role in setting world oil prices. Since its overriding objectives are maximizing revenues generated from oil exports and extending the life of its petroleum reserves, Riyadh aims to keep prices high as long as possible. But the price cannot be so high that it stifles demand or encourages other competitive sources of supply. Nor can it be so low that the kingdom cannot achieve minimum revenue targets. The critical balancing act of Saudi foreign policy, therefore, is to maintain oil prices within a reasonable price band. Stopping oil prices from falling below the minimum level requires cooperation from other OPEC countries and occasionally from non-OPEC producers. Preventing oil prices from rising too high requires keeping enough spare production capacity to use in an emergency. This latter feature is the signal characteristic of Saudi policy. The kingdom can afford to maintain this spare capacity because of the abundance of its oil reserves and the comparatively low cost of developing and producing its reserve base. In today's soft market, in which Saudi Arabia produces around 7.4 mbd, the kingdom has close to 3 mbd of spare capacity. Its spare capacity is usually ample enough to entirely displace the production of another large oil-exporting country if supply is disrupted or a producer tries to reduce output to increase prices. Not only does this spare capacity help the kingdom keep prices in check, but it also serves to link Riyadh with the United States and other key oil-importing countries. It is a blunt instrument that makes policymakers elsewhere beholden to Riyadh for energy security. This spare capacity is greater than the total exports of all other oil-exporting countries -- except Russia. Saudi spare capacity is the energy equivalent of nuclear weapons, a powerful deterrent against those who try to challenge Saudi leadership and Saudi goals. It is also the centerpiece of the U.S.- Saudi relationship. The United States relies on that capacity as the cornerstone of its oil policy. That arrangement was fine as long as U.S. protection meant Riyadh would not "blackmail" Washington -- an assumption that is more difficult to accept after September 11. Saudi Arabia's OPEC partners must also cooperate with the kingdom in part to prevent Riyadh from producing a glut and having prices collapse; spare capacity also serves to pressure key non-OPEC producers to cooperate with Saudi Arabia when necessary. But unlike the nuclear deterrent, the Saudi weapon is actively used when required. The kingdom has periodically (and brutally) demonstrated that it can use its spare capacity to destroy exports from countries challenging its market share. This tactic is the weapon that Saudi Arabia could use if Moscow ignores Riyadh's requests for cooperation. Saudi Arabia has triggered its spare capacity twice in recent history, once when prices were especially low. Both cases demonstrated that the kingdom will accept those low prices so long as it suffers less than its targets do. In 1985, Saudi Arabia successfully waged a price war designed to force other oil producers to stop "free riding" on Saudi oil policy. That policy meant that those states had to cooperate with the kingdom by reining in production enough to allow Saudi Arabia to produce the minimum level that it targeted. Oil prices fell by more than half within a few months, and Saudi Arabia immediately regained the market share it had lost in the preceding four years, mainly to non-OPEC countries.

#### Low oil prices wreck the Russian economy—high prices create a window for sustained growth

**IMF, 11** - International Monetary Fund (9/27/11, "Russia Should Leverage Commodity Boom to Boost Growth", http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2011/int092711a.htm, KONTOPOULOS)

**Russia’s economy grew** by 4 percent in 2010, **aided by the boom in** commodity **prices, in** particular **oil.** For 2011, the IMF is projecting growth of 4.3 percent. But Russia could do much better. Before the global financial crisis, the economy was growing at more than 7 percent per year, and it could take off again if economic policies and the supporting policy institutions are strengthened. **Russia** also **remains overly reliant on oil revenues, which makes it vulnerable to a** slowdown in economic growth and a **sudden drop in** commodity **prices**. In an interview, **IMF mission chief for Russia** Juha **Kähkönen and deputy mission chief** Daria **Zakharova discuss the outlook for Russia’s economy, and weigh risks** such as continued crisis in the euro area or a pronounced slowdown in the global economy. IMF Survey online: What is the outlook for Russia’s economy? **Kähkönen: Russia is still benefiting from high oil prices**, but its post-crisis economic performance has been disappointing, with only moderate growth and high inflation. Russia saw a major decline in output of about 8 percent of GDP during the global crisis, and is still catching up. The economy grew by 4 percent in 2010 and is projected to grow by 4.3 percent this year. Growth has suffered as a result of a bad harvest in 2010 brought on by drought. The economy is also slowing down now because of the ongoing turmoil in advanced countries. Going forward, Russia’s outlook will depend not just on the external environment but also on economic policies. If current policies—a high nonoil fiscal deficit and no clear medium-term anchor for fiscal policy, monetary policy that is insufficiently focused on reducing inflation, a financial sector lacking adequate oversight, and stalled structural reforms—are maintained, the result will be muddling through, with growth tapering off to below 4 percent in the medium term. But if there is a major strengthening of the economic policies, Russia’s potential is huge. The country could easily grow by an annual rate of 6 percent or more on a sustained basis if the right policies are put in place. IMF Survey online: How vulnerable is the economy to ongoing turmoil in Europe and the slowdown in global growth? Zakharova: **If the crisis** in the euro area intensifies and **leads to** another global downturn and **a precipitous fall in oil prices, Russia’s economy could be severely affected.** Russia could also be impacted through the financial channel. Although Russia’s direct exposure to European sovereign debt is limited, a severe distress in a large bank in a core euro area country could have serious repercussions for Russia’s banking system. IMF Survey online: What are your main recommendations to the Russian authorities on the macroeconomic policy mix? Kähkönen: **High oil prices give Russia a window of opportunity to put the economy on a higher growth path**. Policies should be strengthened in four main policy areas: monetary policy, fiscal policy, structural reforms to improve the business climate, and banking sector supervision. We think it would be most beneficial to have action simultaneously in all of these areas because the reforms would be mutually reinforcing. Russia’s macroeconomic policies would also benefit from more stable and predictable frameworks. Right now, there are too many ad hoc policy decisions. In terms of monetary policy, we think the central bank should focus squarely on inflation. In the past, the bank has had multiple targets, which has diluted the emphasis on price stability. Russia’s underlying inflation currently is high at about 8 percent. Zakharova: The fiscal policy framework should also be strengthened. Right now, policy focus is on the overall fiscal balance. But because Russia is an oil producer, it is more appropriate to look at the nonoil deficit—the size of the deficit before taking oil revenues into account. This deficit increased by 9 percent of GDP during the crisis, with Russia implementing one of the largest fiscal stimuli in the Group of 20 (G-20) leading industrial and emerging market countries. Our advice is to refocus fiscal policy on the nonoil balance and introduce an ambitious, credible, and growth-friendly fiscal consolidation that aims at reaching a nonoil deficit of 4.7 percent, the current long-term fiscal target of the government. We also recommend that Russia refrain from enacting further supplementary budgets, which in the past have been used to spend excess oil revenues. Supplementary budgets make fiscal policy pro-cyclical, thus undermining macroeconomic stability. IMF Survey online: Russia has been riding high on the commodity boom, but **what will happen if prices start to falter?** Zakharova: **Russia has been rescued** from the recent financial crisis **by a strong recovery in oil prices, but in the process the economy has become much more vulnerable to a sudden drop in** commodity **prices.** **Russia’s nonoil deficit has** almost **tripled** following the crisis. Just to put this in perspective, **if oil prices were to fall to $40 per barrel as they did during the most recent financial crisis, Russia would be running deficits in the order of 8 percent of GDP.** At the same time, **the Oil Reserve Fund, which Russia** successfully **used to cushion the economy** in the most recent downturn, **has been** almost **exhausted. This means that the government would have to borrow from the markets**—and possibly at high rates—**if there is a** precipitous **drop in oil prices. The external current account would also be severely affected by a decline in oil prices.** We would expect that the current high surplus would turn into a deficit fairly quickly, putting pressure on the exchange rate.

#### Causes multiple scenarios for CBW conflictOliker and Charlick-Paley 02 (Olga and Tanya, RAND Corporation Project Air Force, “Assessing Russia’s Decline,” www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1442/)

The preceding chapters have illustrated the ways in which Russia’s decline affects that country and may evolve into challenges and dangers that extend well beyond its borders. The political factors of decline may make Russia a less stable international actor and other factors may increase the risk of internal unrest. Together and separately, they increase the risk of conflict and the potential scope of other imaginable disasters. The trends of regionalization, particularly the disparate rates of economic growth among regions, combined with the politicization of regional economic and military interests, will be important to watch. The potential for locale, or possibly ethnicity, to serve as a rallying point for internal conflict is low at present, but these factors have the potential to feed into precisely the cycle of instability that political scientists have identified as making states in transition to democracy more likely to become involved in war. These factors also increase the potential for domestic turmoil, which further increases the risk of international conflict, for instance if Moscow seeks to united a divided nation and/or demonstrate globally that its waning power remains something to be reckoned with. Given Russia’s conventional weakness, an increased risk of conflict carries with it an increased risk of nuclear weapons use, and Russia’s demographic situation increases the potential for a major epidemic with possible implications for Europe and perhaps beyond. The dangers posed by Russia’s civilian and military nuclear weapons complex, aside from the threat of nuclear weapons use, create a real risk of proliferation of weapons or weapons materials to terrorist groups, as well as perpetuating an increasing risk of accident at one of Russia’s nuclear power plants or other facilities. These elements touch upon key security interests, thus raising serious concerns for the United States. A declining Russia increases the likelihood of conflict—internal or otherwise—and the general deterioration that Russia has in common with “failing” states raises serious questions about its capacity to respond to an emerging crisis. A crisis in large, populous, and nuclear-armed Russia can easily affect the interests of the United States and its allies. In response to such a scenario, the United States, whether alone or as part of a larger coalition, could be asked to send military forces to the area in and around Russia. This chapter will explore a handful of scenarios that could call for U.S. involvement. A wide range of crisis scenarios can be reasonably extrapolated from the trends implicit in Russia’s decline. A notional list includes: Authorized or unauthorized belligerent actions by Russia troops in trouble-prone Russian regions or in neighboring states could lead to armed conflict. Border clashes with China in the Russian Far East or between Russia and Ukraine, the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, or another neighbor could escalate into interstate combat. Nuclear-armed terrorists based in Russia or using weapons or materials diverted from Russian facilities could threaten Russia, Europe, Asia, or the United States. Civil war in Russia could involve fighting near storage sites for nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and agents, risking large-scale contamination and humanitarian disaster. A nuclear accident at a power plant or facility could endanger life and health in Russia and neighboring states. A chemical accident at a plant or nuclear or nuclear-related facility could endanger life and health in Rusisa and neighboring states. Ethnic pogrom in south Russia could force refugees into Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and/or Ukraine. Economic and ethnic conflicts in Caucasus could erupt into armed clashes, which would endanger oil and gas pipelines in the region. A massive ecological disaster such as an earthquake, famine, or epidemic could spawn refugees and spread illness and death across borders. An increasingly criminalized Russian economy could create a safe haven for crime or even terrorist-linked groups. From this base, criminals, drug traders, and terrorists could threaten the people and economies of Europe, Asia, and the United States. Accelerated Russian weapons and technology sales or unauthorized diversion could foster the proliferation of weapons and weapon materials to rogue states and nonstate terrorist actors, increasing the risk of nuclear war.

### Adv 1

#### War won’t go nuclear

Enders 2 (Jan 30, David, Michigan Daily, “Experts say nuclear war still unlikely,” http://www.michigandaily.com/content/experts-say-nuclear-war-still-unlikely)

\* Ashutosh Varshney – Professor of Political Science and South Asia expert at the University of Michigan

\* Paul Huth – Professor of International Conflict and Security Affairs at the University of Maryland

\* Kenneth Lieberthal – Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. Former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council

University political science Prof. Ashutosh Varshney becomes animated when asked about the likelihood of nuclear war between India and Pakistan.¶ "Odds are close to zero," Varshney said forcefully, standing up to pace a little bit in his office. "The assumption that India and Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the U.S.S.R. and U.S. or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of leaders in both India and Pakistan than would be warranted."¶ The worlds two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous.¶ "The decision makers are aware of what nuclear weapons are, even if the masses are not," he said.¶ "Watching the evening news, CNN, I think they have vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war," political science Prof. Paul Huth said.¶ Varshney added that there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war.¶ "India is committed to a no-first-strike policy," Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to go for a first strike, because the retaliation would be gravely dangerous."¶ Political science Prof. Kenneth Lieberthal, a former special assistant to President Clinton at the National Security Council, agreed. "Usually a country that is in the position that Pakistan is in would not shift to a level that would ensure their total destruction," Lieberthal said, making note of India"s considerably larger nuclear arsenal.¶ "American intervention is another reason not to expect nuclear war," Varshney said. "If anything has happened since September 11, it is that the command control system has strengthened. The trigger is in very safe hands."

#### War in the Middle East will never escalate to all-out war – conflicts remain relatively localized

Cook, Takeyh, and Maloney, 07 (Douglas Dillon Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Ray, Senior Fellow For Middle Eastern Studies at the CFR, Suzanne, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, June 28, , online: http://www.cfr.org/publication/13702/why\_the\_iraq\_war\_wont\_engulf\_the\_mideast.html, accessed December 25, 2007)

Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else’s fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

#### No escalation – great powers will cooperate

**Collins and Wohlforth, 04** - \*professor of political science at Notre Dame AND \*\*professor of government at Dartmouth (Kathleen and William, “Defying ‘Great Game’ Expectations, Strategic Asia 2003-2004, <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/15-Central%20Asia-press.pdf>)

While cautious realism must remain the watchword concerning an impoverished and potentially unstable region comprised of fragile and authoritarian states, our analysis yields at least conditional and relative optimism. Given the confluence of their chief strategic interests, the major powers are in a better position to serve as a stabilizing force than analogies to the Great Game or the Cold War would suggest. It is important to stress that the region’s response to the profoundly destabilizing shock of coordinated terror attacks was increased cooperation between local governments and China and Russia, and—multipolar rhetoric notwithstanding—between both of them and the United States. If this trend is nurtured and if the initial signals about potential SCO-CSTO-NATO cooperation are pursued, another destabilizing shock might generate more rather than less cooperation among the major powers. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan are clearly on a trajectory that portends longer-term cooperation with each of the great powers. As military and economic security interests become more entwined, there are sound reasons to conclude that “great game” politics will not shape Central Asia’s future in the same competitive and destabilizing way as they have controlled its past. To the contrary, mutual interests in Central Asia may reinforce the broader positive developments in the great powers’ relations that have taken place since September 11, as well as reinforce regional and domestic stability in Central Asia.

**The world is moving to pluralism, not multipolarity – the US can still maintain unipolar leadership because most challengers are regional**

**Etzioni, 13** - served as a senior advisor to the Carter White House; taught at Columbia University, Harvard University and The University of California at Berkeley; and is currently a university professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University (Amitai, “The Devolution of American Power” 37 Fletcher F. World Aff. 13, lexis)

The theory that the world is moving from a unipolar order, dominated by the United States, to a multipolar distribution of power has led to a robust debate concerning the consequences of this change on the international order. However, the global power distribution is currently following a different pattern. Instead of what is conventionally addressed as a global unipolar to multipolar shift, in fact rising powers are mainly regional powers, not global ones, although they may have global reach. This pattern should be expected to continue in the near future and should be accounted for in order to make sound policy. It follows that the movement away from a unipolar world should not be equated with one in which more global powers contend with each other; nor should it be equated with a world in which new powers take over from an old, declining power. Moreover, it should not be assumed that the world will be less ordered. Instead, to a significant extent, the change seems to be toward more regional autonomy, or increased devolution, and greater variety in the relationships between the United States and regional powers. These relationships may see regional powers serve as junior partners to the global power and assume some of the global power's regional responsibilities. Or these relationships may produce junior adversarial regional powers that seek greater relative regional control in defiance of the United States, but seek at most limited realignment of power on the global stage. In the process of devolution, the increase in regional self-government and pluralism are much less challenging to the global power than [\*14] the redistribution of power implied by multipolarity. Indeed, as junior regional powers increasingly act as partners and assume regional responsibilities, they enable the global power to scale back its global commitments without losing much of its weight in international developments. Similarly, the desire for regional control among rising powers can be more readily accommodated than aspirations to challenge the United States as a global superpower. It must be noted that the notion of devolution as used here is that of an ideal, n1 and as such there will be significant variation in its real-world instantiations. However, the process of devolution suggests a logical pattern of behavior for all actors involved, upon which various powers can construct a viable strategy. While the movement from a uni- to a multipolar distribution of global power is considered by some to be "positive" and more supportive of international institutions, n2 others consider it as "negative" and likely to lead to confrontation between the declining power and the rising ones. n3 In truth, the move to a higher level of regional pluralism is a double-edged sword. The effect of the transformation depends on the particular accommodation pattern that develops between each regional power and the global power. As indicated previously, this pattern can vary from that of a junior partner to that of a regional antagonist. Stated in other terms, if unipolarity is compared to hierarchy and multipolarity is compared to flat systems or networks, regional pluralism is analogous to increased subsidiarity. Importantly, the accommodation pattern between the global superpower and regional powers is fundamentally different from the one between declining and rising global powers. In the former case, the regional powers do not seek to modify or replace the global rules or change the global distribution of public goods. Instead, they aim merely to gain local exemptions from the rules, variants in the ways they are applied, or increases in their share of distributed benefits. Superpowers may prove unwilling to accommodate such regional challenges and regional challengers may hold that they have been insufficiently accommodated. [\*15] However, such global/regional accommodations are, in general, easier to reach than the global/global accommodations between declining and rising global powers, and thus are less likely to lead to outright conflicts. With devolution, the central power yields, therefore risking much less when pluralism increases than when a transition from uni- to multipolarity takes place. This is one of the principle strengths of

**Unilateralism is what sustains primacy – other states bandwagon with the US for fear of other rising powers. Moving towards multilateralism makes it unsustainable**

**Seldena, 13** – assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida (Zachary, “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony” Security Studies Volume 22, Issue 2, 2013, Taylor and Francis)

Understanding which of these choices—soft balancing against the hegemon or alignment with the hegemon—is more prevalent among second-tier states has significant ramifications for the endurance of American hegemony. The record of the 2001–2009 period indicates that a wide range of second-tier states not only aligned with the United States, they strengthened their security cooperation in a manner that extended the reach of the us military at a time when American foreign policy was widely seen as unilateral. 3 In addition, they did so by incurring certain costs that helped to spread the burden of maintaining the American hegemonic system. This pattern of alignment with the United States has implications for the endurance of American hegemony because states aligned with the United States may have more at stake in the maintenance of American hegemony than the United States itself. A smaller American naval presence in the Asia Pacific region, for example, may be seen as a relatively minor shift in the United States with some beneficial budgetary savings. In Vietnam, Australia, or the Philippines, however, such a shift could prompt a wholesale reevaluation of national defense policy and have costly implications. Therefore, second-tier states have an incentive to participate in activities that extend the endurance of American hegemony, even if they do not receive a formal security guarantee for their efforts. This may have implications for American foreign policy. There are distinct policy recommendations flowing from the logic of those scholars and policy professionals who argue that a more proactive and unilateral foreign policy speeds the decline of American hegemony. The most important of these is that the United States should practice a policy of self-restraint that defers to international organizations, which would alleviate concerns about the current preponderance of the United States in the international system. 4 A policy of self-restraint would signal that the United States is not a threat to other major powers and preclude attempts at balancing. This policy would also help to set a norm for the behavior of future great powers and recognize the emerging reality of a multipolar world. 5 Another policy implication from this line of reasoning is that the United States should reduce its global military presence that both encourages balancing behavior by other states and speeds hegemonic decline by draining financial resources. 6 Yet, this policy of restraint may be precisely what would cause second-tier states to question the utility of their security relationship with the United States and move away from policies that help to maintain American hegemony

. This could at least partially explain the trend of states moving to establish closer security relationships with the United States in the 2001–2009 period, when it was at its most proactive and least deferential to international organizations. States may logically conclude that a hegemon willing to project power regardless of international opinion will be likely to use its power in the defense of the hegemony that is in the interest of second-tier states. Second-tier states might be far less willing to contribute to the maintenance of American hegemony if the United States behaves in a manner that **raises doubts as to the durability of its commitments** or its willingness to use its power in the international arena. Thus, what would trigger a serious decline in the cooperation that helps to sustain American hegemony would be a self-imposed reduction in the ability of the United States to project power and an increased reluctance to use its power in support of its national interests.